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STUDENT NOTES
INTO THE MIRE OF UNCERTAINTY:
UNION DISCIPLINARY FINES AND NLRA
§ 8(b)(1)(A)
OVERVIEW

The scope and variety of the... problems suggest that Section
8(b)(1) may plunge the Board [National Labor Relations Board]
into a dismal swamp of uncertainty.Its vagueness alone, not to
mention the broad interpretationsput upon it in debates in
Congress, encourages the filing of great numbers of charges....
A long period of uncertainty and heavy volume of litigations
will be necessary before questions of interpretationcan be solved.1
Professor Cox's prediction has proved to be accurate. The legal
parameters of appropriate vis-i-vis inappropriate levying of disciplinary fines is still developing. This development is on a slow
case by case basis plagued with unarticulated analytical standards, inconsistent legislative interpretation, and contradictory
policy determinations. This article examines the legal parameters of union disciplinary actions timidly established by the
labor laws, the courts, and the NLRB. Part I examines the ability of, and extent to which, unions may discipline their ranks.
This grant of power stems from, and is held in check by, the
federal labor law, although the particular remedies available to
the disciplining union have been defined by the courts and the
NLRB. Part II focuses on the operational constraints placed
upon the union's ability to levy penalties, particularly court enforced fines, as delineated by the courts and the Board. Part III
examines the operation of these developing concepts in similar
factual situations with attention toward discerning operational
rules of union conduct. And Part IV examines and summarizes
the interface between the theoretical and practical constraints
placed upon both unions and employees in exercising their
respective statutory rights.
I Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor-ManagementRelations Act, 61 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 33 (1947).
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8(b)(1)(A)

The Extent of Union Discipline under FederalLabo? Law

Unions derive the power to discipline members from their
constitutions and by-laws. This grant of power extends to a wide
variety of internal transgressions by members without the triggering of an unfair labor practice violation. When the alleged
transgression by the member goes beyond the violation of the
internally created rules of the labor union and encompasses the
member's rights and privileges granted under the federal labor
laws, the analysis shifts toward a balancing of the member's
statutory rights against the union's right to self-governance to
determine the legality of the imposed disciplinary sanction.
The cornerstone of an employee-member's statutory rights
is § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (hereinafter NLRA). This act grants employees the rights to engage in
or refrainfrom activities of self-organization and "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid or
protection. 12 In § 13 of the NLRA the right of employees to use
the strike weapon as a concerted activity is also specifically protected.' The NLRA gives effect to these employee held rights by
declaring-an unfair labor practice for both employers' and labor
unions' to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of these
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The entire provisions reads:
Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in Section 158(a)(3) of this title.
3 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970). The entire provision reads:
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish
in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications in that right.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
5 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1970). The entire provision reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(1) To restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
granted in Section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall
not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership; or (B) an
2
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aforementioned rights. Moreover, a labor organization may not
indirectly infringe upon these rights. The union may not
restrain an employer in the selection of supervisory personnel,,
or force the dismissal of any employee "on some ground other
than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership."' These employee protected rights are but one side
of the analysis of union disciplinary actions; balanced on the
other side is the right of the labor organization, a member
created, constitutionally based organization, to govern itself.
This is authorized through NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) stating "that this
paragraph shall not impair the right of labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein."'8
Thus, the balance is struck; on one side are the employee
held rights under the ambit of NLRA § 7, enforceable through
NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), on the other is the right of a union to govern
itself under the NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) proviso. This balance ostensibly takes the form of a statutory duality. One component of
the duality examines the unions interface upon an employee's
job rights as defined by the relationship of the employeemember vis-A-vis the employer. The other component examines
the relationship of the union vis-A-vis the employee-member.
Disciplinary actions which affect an employee's job rights and
fall within the ambit of NLRA § 7 are within the jurisdiction of
the NLRB through NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A).' Disciplinary actions
which affect the relationshipof the union to its membership are
employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.
I'Id.
7 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970). The entire provision
reads:
[T]o cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an

employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to
discrimiate against an employee to with respect whom membership in
such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other
than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
' See note 5 supra. Interestingly, these rules need not be spelled out with
specificity in the union constitution or by-laws. International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers v. Hardman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971). See also Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970).
' See notes 2-7 supra, and accompanying text. See generally, Millan,
DisciplinaryDevelopments Under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 20 Loy. L. REV. 245, 278-80 (1974).
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within the jurisdiction of the internal union government through
the NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) proviso, and under certain circumstances,
the courts. 10 Unfortunately in practical terms, this jurisdictional
demarcation cannot be clearly drawn since a particular disciplinary action may simultaneously impact upon both components
of the statutory duality. Moreover, in cases dealing with the
public policy exception the statutory duality concept has been
ignored altogether.
Superimposed upon the disciplinary power of unions are
three general substantive constraints. First, disciplinary matters exclusively internal do not trigger Board perusal as no
NLRA § 7 rights are allegedly violated. Thus, for example, fining a member for failure to attend a union meeting is handled
entirely internally." However, the determination of what constitutes an internal matter is not clear-cut. A union disciplinary
rule which serves a legitimate union interest, even though it encroaches on NLRA § 7 rights, can be deemed, in balance, as an
internal matter and not subject to Board scrutiny." Thus, the
determination of legitimate union interests served by a particular rule is a major focal point in the balancing analysis. A second
and perhaps rather obvious substantive constraint is that discipline can only be applied to current members of the union. Employees, as union members, can leave the union and escape the
post resignation application of a union rule." Although a simple
concept, this presents a myriad of operational problems discussed in Part II.
The third substantive constraint can almost be considered
as a coequal input into the balance and is another key analytical
focal point. This has been termed as the "public policy excep-.
10See Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C .
§§ 401-531 (1970). This Act sets up certain procedural safeguards in regard to
union discipline.. See notes 25-28 infra; 46-60 infra, and accompanying text.
" Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 727 (1954).
" For example, the following have been termed "internal offenses": (1) Exceeding production quotas in violation of union rule; (2) strikebreaking; (3)
attempting to coerce union officials; (4) reporting for work after local but before
international had ratified new contract; (5) working with nonunion employees; (6)
reporting co-workers to management in violation of union rules; (7) splitting vacations in violation of union rules. Whether an offense is "internal" is largely a matter of the specific factual situation and called internal until a post hoc review by
the Board or the courts. See notes 77-112 infra, and accompanying text.
1,Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969).
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tion" and defies operational definition." Rather, the public policy
exception is a catch-all category allowing the Board to entertain
jurisdiction over a wide variety of matters under the aegis of
NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A).' 5 Analytically, it would be easy to conceive of
the Board examining a disciplinary action, determining the activity was protected under NLRA § 7, finding it violated NLRA
§ 8(b)(1)(A), and enjoining its enforcement. But such is not the
case. Each of these concepts and their interface within the statutory duality has yet to be operationally defined by the Board
and the courts. Moreover, using the expansive language of
NLRA § 7 and the "public policy" of the labor legislation the
Board can expand coverage beyond the limits of the statutory
duality concept to enjoin a wider variety of union disciplinary
actions. For example, the NLRB has expanded coverage to enjoin union disciplinary actions which attempted to regulate
members' access to NLRB processes, ' for refusal to strike in the
face of a no strike clause, 1 for refusal to honor an illegal organizational picket line,'" and for nonadherence to a secondary boycott.'9 The Board has also used the public policy exception to
pierce further into the internal disciplinary process and examine
improper ulterior motives of a union in imposing disciplinary actions. This open ended public policy exception view, due to its
lack of operational guidelines, has not been entirely embraced
by the courts" nor applied uniformly by the Board.' In some
cases, for example, the Board has taken a hybrid approach, restricting only the remedy available to the union rather than enjoining the sanction entirely."
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968).
" See notes 2 and 5 supra.
11H. B. Roberts, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 674 (1964), enforced, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) Local 138 IUOE (Charles S. Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. No. 679 (1964).
" Communications Workers Local 1197, 202 N.L.R.B. No. 229 (1973).
" Retail Clerks Local 1179, 211 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1974), enforced, 526 F.2d
142 (9th Cir. 1975).
" Building & Constr. Trades Council, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 1276 (1976).
," Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 193 N.L.R.B. No. 920
(1971), enforced, 270 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1972).
, See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 18, IUOE, 503 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1974).
U See, e.g., International Molder's And Allied Wkrs., Local 125 (Blackhawk
Tanning Co.), 178 N.L.R.B. No. 208 (1969), enforced, 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971);
Tawas Tube Products, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1965).
0 Id. Part Im elaborates on this peculiar partial restriction. See notes 94-96
infra, and accompanying text.
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In addition to the general substantive constraints imposed
upon union disciplinary actions, there are also procedural constraints. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 19594 (hereinafter LMRDA) § 101(a)(5) provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of
dues by such an organization or by an officer thereof unless
such member has been (A) served with written specific charges;
(B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C)afforded
a full and fair hearing."
Suffice to say, having the internal labor organization be both
judge and prosecutor of alleged union violations affords the
disciplined union member a questionable impartial tribunal.
Redress under LMRDA § 101(a)(5) is available only to individual
members through a civil action under LMRDA § 102" unless the
Board can exercise "subject matter" jurisdiction under the
NLRA § 8(b) unfair labor practice provisions or the public policy
exception. Although beyond the scope of this article, the organizational due process requirements in LMRDA § 101(a)(5) are at a
minimum, and judicial scrutiny of internal union discipline in
terms of union rule interpretation, previolation notice requirements, and the penalties imposed is limited. 8
In summation thus far, unions are empowered to create and
reasonably enforce internal rules which reflect legitimate union
interests as long as the rules are enforced only against
members, meet certain procedural standards, and impair no
policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws.
The Penalties Available to the Union

B.

The penalties available to a union imposing a disciplinary action essentially involve: (1) expulsion; (2) suspension; and (3)
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
5 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970).

2

2 See T. Keeline, NLRB AND JUDICIAL CONTROL OF UNION DIsCIPLINE 46-86
(U.Pa. Wharton School, Industrial Research Unit, Labor Rel. & Pub. Pol'y Serv.

Rep. No. 13, 1976). See generally, Wellington, Union Fines and Workers'Rights,

85 YALE L. J. 1022, 1028-32; Beard & Player, Union Discipline of its Membership
Under Section 101(a)(5) of Landrum-Griffin:-What is "Discipline"and How Much
Discipline is Due, 9 GA. L. REV. 383 (1975).
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970). See also note 10 supra.
" International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardman, 401 U.S. 233

(1971). See also author's comment at note 8 supra and note 26 supra.
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fines, inclusive of (a) fines enforced through threat of expulsion
or suspension and (b) fines enforced through state courts. As
stated previously, Board scrutiny is triggered when the disciplinary action and its enforcement allegedly "restrain or coerce"
an employee's NLRA § 7 rights through a NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A)
violation, when such action and enforcement fall under the
public policy exception, or, in NLRA § 8(b)(2) situations, when
the union attempts to have an employee improperly dismissed.
A major problem lies in the imprecise nature of the terms
"restrain or coerce" and "public policy." NLRA § 8(b)(2)
establishes one definable limit beyond which a union may not
pursue enforcement of a penalty,' but other enforcement limits
of expulsion, suspension, and fines are not so readily ascertainable.
Expelling a member for conduct which betrays an objective
of the union is generally permissible subject to challenge under
LMRDA § 101(a)(5) through a member's civil action through
LMRDA § 102.30 However, the imposition of the expulsion penalty was restricted by the Court in NLRB v. Industrial Union of
Maritime and Shipworkers 1 This case held a disciplinary action
resulting in expulsion and falling within the ambit of NLRA § 7
rights or violating public labor policy will be enjoined to the extent that the disciplinary action does not concern an internal
union matter.2 This view, although ostensibly consistent with
the balancing test, is inconsistent with the statutory duality concept. Expulsion is an internal disciplinary action whose penalty
does not directly impair the exercise of an employee's job rights
and, as such, applying the statutory duality concept, Board jurisdiction is not triggered.' Moreover, consider the following excerpt from the legislative history of § 8(b):
The pending measure [§ 8(b)(2)] does not propose any limitation
with respect to the internal affairs of unions. They still will be
able to fire members they wish to fire, and still be able to try
any of their members. All that they will not be able to do... is
See note 7 supra.
* See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
SI

391 U.S. 418 (1969).

Id. at 428. In Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969), the Court stated: "[I]f
the rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may
not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A)."

Id. at 429.
1 See notes 39-45 infra and accompanying text.
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this: If they fire a member for some reason other than non payment of dues they cannot make his employer discharge him
from his job and throw him out of work.M
Accordingly, when read with NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso allowing union self-governance, a strong case may be made to exclude
expulsion from the "restraint and coercion" language of NLRA §
8(b)(1)(A). This argument can be buttressed with the observations that the expelled member's job security is not in immediate jeopardy, the penalty is entirely internal involving no external enforcement agencies or coercion, and the procedural requirements under LMRDA § 101(a)(5) must still be met. Similar
arguments can be made for disciplinary enforcement involving
suspension and the enforcement of fines through the threat of
expulsion. In essence, this argument posits that a member can
escape the rule or penalty by resigning or being expelled"3 and
the union can sidestep the issue of a possible NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A)
violation, leaving NLRA § 8(b)(2) to limit the action.
Expulsion, suspension, and fines enforced through the
threat of expulsion are internally enforced penalties. A different
situation arises in cases involving the imposition of fines when
enforcement is secured not through expulsion but through state
court proceedings. This penalty can be viewed as externally enforced. This particular twist to the enforcement of union disciplinary actions was approved by the Supreme Court in 1967
with NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers." Allis-Chalmers brought into
analysis interpretation of the previously discussed legislative
provisions focusing on policy arguments and the "restraint and
coercion" language of NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A). The majority opinion
approved court-enforced reasonable fines as a proper penalty
through reliance on a weak public policy argument.
Where a union is strong and membership therefore valuable, to
require expulsion of a member visits a far more severe penalty
93 Cong. Rec. 4193, II Leg. Hist. 1097 as cited in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers,
388 U.S. 175, 185 (1967) (Emphasis supplied).
" This adopts a view consistent with NLRA § 7 right to refuse to aid a labor
organization. Consider the view expressed in Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423
(1969): "[Section] 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule...
against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." Id.
at 430. The Court went on to apply this escape provision enjoining penalties imposed after a member has left the union.
, 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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upon the member than a reasonable fine. Where the union is
weak, and membership therefore of little value, the union faced
with further depletion of its ranks may have no choice except to
condone the member's disobedience.Y
Accordingly, the union chose a penalty less severe than expulsion and, therefore, at least to this point, had not "restrained or
coerced" members under NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A). Moreover, the
Court read the proviso to NLRA § 8(b)(1) as being silent on the
issue of court-enforced fines and hence a permissible sanction.,
It went on to express the statutory duality concept, distinguishing between the Board's jurisdiction over job rights and the
union's jurisdiction over member rights. The Court held that the
Board has no jurisdiction over the "means of union rule enforcement." While this is an accurate application of the statutory
duality concept as it applies to internal penalties, the ramifications of this concept as applied to external penalties are
substantively different. Arguably ignoring the impact upon
NLRA § 7 rights and the practical and theoretical difference
between externally enforced penalties and internally enforced
penalties, 9 the Court concluded that the union did not "restrain
or coerce" members under NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) 4 Thus, courtenforced fines were added to a union's list of available sanctions
with little guidance as to their application.
The separation of the means of external rule enforcement
from Board consideration is a fundamental judgmental flaw.
Since a member cannot escape the court enforcement of the fine
by leaving the union, the nature and amount of penalties available to the union will unquestionably have a significant economic
impact upon the job rights of the employee-member. The union
disciplinary process is internal. The rules are created, interpreted, and enforced by internal union tribunals. It follows that
the penalties imposed should also be limited to internal enforcement. Allowing unions to resort to external enforcement while
blindly applying the statutory duality concept opens many
avenues for abuse without adequately protecting the disciplined
member's NLRA § 7 rights.
'7
U

Id. at 183.
Id. at 191-93.
Id at 202-08 (Black, J., dissenting.

'o

Id. at 195.
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Justice Black, dissenting in Allis-Chalmers, strongly expressed displeasure over the issue of court-enforced fines. He
argued that the Court ignored the practical and theoretical differences between court-enforced fines and expulsion-enforced
fines.' Moreover, Justice Black viewed court-enforced fines as
improper regardless of whether the disciplinary action fell
under the ambit of NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A).
It is one thing to say that Congress did not wish to interfere
with the union's power, similar to that of any other kind of
voluntary association, to prescribe specific conditions of
membership. It is quite another thing to say that Congress intended to leave unions free to exercise a court-like power to try
and punish members with a direct economic sanction for exercising their right to work.'"
The dissent further implies that since external enforcement is
involved, disciplinary actions infringing upon the ambit of
NLRA § 7 rights are by definition restraint and coercion and
should tip any balance toward a finding of a NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A)
violation." This issue of articulating and balancing the employee's NLRA § 7 rights was ineffectively addressed by the majority in Allis-Chalmers."
The union power to levy court enforceable fines, the application of a strict statutory quality concept in matters concerning
external penalties, and the NLRB's retention of an expanded
public policy exception allowing the Board to exercise jurisdiction in "some cases" leads to a rather confusing state of the law.
Moreover, the failure of the Allis-Chalmers Court to adequately
address the theory and ramification of the "means of rule enforcement" exception to Board scrutiny and its place, if any, in
determining if a NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) violation or infringement on
public policy has occurred has contributed to inconsistency in
Board and court decisions. 5
11Id. at 202-08 (Black, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting) (Emphasis supplied).
3 Id. at 202-08 (Black, J., dissenting).
" See notes 36-40 supra, and accompanying text.
0 See generally, Archer, Allis-Chalmers Recycled A Current View of a
Union's Right to Fine Employees for Crossing a Picket Line, 7 IND. L. REV. 498,
515-18 (1974).
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II.

CONSTRAINTS ON THE UNION'S ABILITY TO LEVY FINES

In balancing the rights of unions and their employeemembers in the disciplinary action context, the courts and the
Board now have the added consideration of the ramifications of
an external penalty, albeit after Allis-Chalmers only implicitly
or through the public policy exception. With an externally enforceable fine available, the questions of reasonableness of
amount, against whom it can be levied, and how it can be circumvented arise.
A.

The Reasonableness of Fines
The dictum in Allis-Chalmers used the adjective
"reasonable" in permitting external fines to escape NLRA §
8(b)(1)(A) violation." In Scofield v. NLRB the Court reiterated
this inference stating "that the union rule is valid and that its
enforcement by reasonable fines does not constitute the
restraint or coercion proscribed by Section 8(b)(1)(A). ' ' 7 This dicta led to speculation that the Court viewed unreasonable fines
as an analytical point in determining a NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) violation. The issue of reasonableness of fines, however, is part and
parcel of the means of rule enforcement and ostensibly within
the union's jurisdiction under the statutory duality concept. In
Allis-Chalmers the Court viewed this issue as an internal union
matter and an impermissible avenue of Board inquiry." The
NLRB read the Allis-Chalmers and Scofield dicta as requiring
the issue of reasonableness to be addressed by the state courts
and refused to inquire into the reasonableness of the
disciplinary fine.49
The Board's refusal to inquire into the reasonableness of
fines fared badly in the courts of appeal." Thus, the stage was
set for the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict. In NLRB v.
Boeing Company5' the Court stated:
,6368 U.S. at 183.

394 U.S. at 436 (emphasis supplied).
See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
" International Association of Machinist & Aerospace Wkrs., Lodge 504, 185
N.L.R.B. No. 365, 368 (1970).
1 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated
and remanded, 414 U.S. 807 (1973).
'

"

1 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
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Given the rationale of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, the Board's
conclusion that § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act has nothing to say about
union fines of this nature, whatever their size, is correct. Issues
as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such fines must
be decided upon the basis of the law of contracts, voluntary
associations, or such other principles of law as may be applied
in a forum competent to adjudicate the issue. Under our holding, state courts would be wholly free to apply state law to such
issues at the suit of either the union or the member fined."'
This reverse preemption concept in deferring to state courts,
while arguably consistent with prior decisions, raises many
operational problems. The Court seemingly ignores the special
nature of the relationship between a member and the labor
union," its previously imposed restrictions on review and interpretation of union rules as in the Boilermakers v. Hardman
case, 54 and the myriad of potential due process problems.5
The two dissenting opinions in Boeing recognized the difficulties involved in deferring to state courts a matter involving
a complex area of labor-management relations and would have
preferred a deferral to Board expertise. Additionally, Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Boeing, expressed alarm over the issue of
the reasonableness of fines being given, de facto, to unions. He
observed:
It is not answer to say that the reasonableness of fines may be
tested in a state-court suit. That envisages a rich and powerful
union suing a powerful employee. Employees, however, are
IId. at 74.
The contract concept as applied to union membership is a legal fiction. See
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175 (1967). The law of contracts and law of
voluntary unincorporated associations may have limited usefulness here. First,
the union member writes and rewrites the "living" constitutional contract.
Second, the terms of the "contract" are only generally stated. Rarely would a
union Constitution have an equivalent to a liquidated damages clause for a
breach. This renders an assessment of reasonable damages difficult. And, third,
penalty clauses in contracts are normally unenforceable. One alternative seems to
involve an equity determination in state courts. This approach, however, may
lead to inconsistency among the courts. Standards established by the NLRB or an
equivalent body would be preferable but would probably require amendments to
the present labor laws.
u 401 U.S. 233 (1971). See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
' See Millan, DisciplinaryDevelopment Under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 20 Loy. L. Rav. 245, 278-92 (1974).
' 412 U.S. at 78 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 82-83 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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often at the bottom of the totem pole, without financial
resources, and unworldly when it comes to litigation. Such a
suit is likely to be no contest.'
Moreover, the dissenters expressed the view that the Board
"cannot properly perform its duties under NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A)
unless it determines whether the nature and amount of the fine
levied by the union constitute an unfair labor practice."5' Thus,
the dissent implicitly attacks the inappropriately strict application of the statutory duality concept as it relates to the means of
rule enforcement exception to Board inquiry.
Leaving the issue of reasonableness of fines to state courts
has further compounded the problems discussed in Justice
Black's dissent in Allis-Chalmers.9 The Court in Boeing fails to
provide any operational guidelines to state courts to facilitate a
determination as to the reasonableness of the fines. 5 Moreover,
under the theory that means of rule enforcement are internal
issues, these decisions have an effect of insulating union disciplinary actions from effective Board and court scrutiny, thereby
sacrificing employee-members' rights to potential abuse by
union power.
B.

The Requirement of Full Membership

A union may only discipline members of the organization.'
This requirement of membership, although simple on its face,
does present some problems. An employee who fully avails himself of union benefits by tendering dues, taking the oath of membership, and participating in union affairs can be viewed as
agreeing to the imposition of union disciplinary actions. At the
other extreme sits the employee who merely tenders his dues
and fees without participating in any union affairs. Generally, he
can be viewed as a non-member and as not submitting to the
union's disciplinary reach. Moreover, the union cannot interfere

' Id. at 82 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id at 83 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).

"See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
See generally, Millan, supra note 55.

, Booster Lodge, No. 405, International Ass'n of Machinist & Aerospace
Wkrs. v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973); NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile
Wkrs. Union, Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423
(1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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with his job security without committing an unfair labor practice under NLRA § 8(b)(2)62 or NLRA § 8(b)(3).63 Between these
two extremes exist employees who tender dues and fees, proceed to take the oath of full membership and then do not participate in any, or in limited, union affairs. These employees are
considered full members based on the oath of membership and
are subject to union discipline.
Employees who take the oath of membership with no intention of submitting to union discipline, through misinformation,
or mistaken belief that a union security clause requires membership, fare no better in circumventing union discipline. In AllisChalmers the Court stated: "[T]he relevant inquiry here is not
what motivated a member's full membership but whether the
Taft-Hartley amendments prohibited disciplinary measures
against a full member ....,4 Therefore, if an employee takes the
oath of membership, for whatever reason, he is considered a full
member and subject to union discipline. The Court in Allis-Chalmers and in subsequent cases offers no guidance on how to overcome this presumption or the burden of proof required. The
Board has yet to adequately address this issue in any detail.
Assuming an employee becomes a full union member, for
whatever reasons, under Scofield he can resign from the union
and avoid the union rule. 5 In NLRB v. Granite State Textile
Workers the Court reiterated this position:
Where a member lawfully resigns from a union and thereafter
engages in conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union
commits an unfair labor practice when it seeks enforcement of
fines for that conduct. That is to say, when there is a lawful dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more control over the former member than it has over the man on the
street.'
A resigned member may still have union obligations to fulfill. He
is still required to meet his preresignation financial obligations.
If he is subject to a valid union security clause a resigned member may still be required to tender dues. Additionally, the union
" See note 7 supra.

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970).
388 U.S. 175, 196 (1967).
" See NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Wkrs. Union, Local 1029.
409 U.S. 213 (1972).
"Id. at 217.
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may impose internalsanctions on resigned members such as ex67
pulsion or suspension and place restrictions on their re-entry.
A related question arises as to the effectiveness of the resignation. Where a union's constitution is silent on the issue "a
member is free to resign at will by clearly conveying to the
union his unequivocal intent to resign. '68 This conveyance must
be received by the union and the Board strongly recommends a
written resignation, although oral resignations69 or unequivocal
actions70 are permitted.
A different situation may arise where the union's constitution contains restrictions on the right to resign. In Booster
Lodge 405, 1AM v. NLRB7 1 the Court peripherally addressed the
issue by holding that a no strike breaking clause in a union's
constitution had no carry-over force on resigned members.2 In
dictum the Court stated "we leave open the question of the extent to which contractual restrictions on a member's right to
resign may be limited by the Act [specifically § 7's right to
refuse to engage in concerted activity]." 3 However, the dictum
in American Broadcasting Companies v. Writers Guild indicates
a willingness to accept a union constitution's resignation restrictions applicable during legal strikes.74
The Board has taken a somewhat different approach, holding members' resignations valid in the face of contrary union
constitutional provisions if the provision amounted "to a denial
to members of a voluntary method of severing their relationship
with the union."7 s The Board relied upon the Scofield rationale
" NLRB v. Machinists, District Lodge 99, AFL-CIO, 489 F.2d 769 (1st Cir.
1974); Pattern Makers' Ass'n of Los Angeles and Vicinity, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 15
(1972).
District Lodge 99, International Association of Machinist & Aerospace

Wkrs. (General Electric Co.), 194 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 938 (1972).

65Local 1233, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 231 N.L.R.B.
No. 114 (1978).
, Communications Workers, Local 6135, 188 N.L.R.B. No. 971 (1971).
" 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
7Id. at 89.
71 Id. at 88.
71437 U.S. 411 (1978).
,1Automobile Workers, Local 647 (General Electric), 197 N.L.R.B. No. 93
(1972). See also Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, 240 N.L.R.B. No. 114
(1979); Local 439, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 237 N.L.R.B. No. 34
(1978).
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that employees must be "free to leave the union and escape the
rule.""6 This approach, possibly at odds with the Court, incorporates the balancing of the employee NLRA § 7 right to refrain
from concerted activity and the NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) proviso.
These differences set the stage for a Supreme Court decision in
the future.
III.

DERIVING OPERATIONAL RULES AND THE PROBLEM
OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Thus far the discussion has focused upon the balancing interplay between the NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) proviso, the ambit of
NLRA § 7 rights, and the impact of the public policy exception.
Included within this skeletal paradigm are a variety of diverse
unweighted variables and jurisdictional elements containing unarticulated operational definitions and pre-analysis guidelines.
This part of the article examines the operational effect of the
balancing test within the confines of similar factual situations.
A.

Strikebreaking Members

The right of the union to discipline strikebreaking members
through court-enforced fines balanced against the NLRA § 7
rights of the employee-members appears to favor the union position.77 This right is subject to the restrictions of full membership78 and the NLRA § 8(b)(2) limitation on interference with job
rights. 9 This is a policy decision designed to protect the union's
right to engage in lawful strikes," and perhaps, more fundamentally, to exist. Arguably, without the economic weapons a union
would be powerless against its business organizational counterpart. Allowing labor organizations the use of the economic
weapons implies the need for cohesiveness in the union ranks
for effective implementation. Thus, arguably, an employee
waives his § 7 right to refuse to participate in the collective ac78

Id.

" Booster Lodge v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973); NLRB v. Granite State Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
78 Id.

See note 7 supra.
See note 3 supra. Note, however, that this right is given to employees, not
to unions. It may seem a matter of semantics but by extending the collective
employee rights to union rights the contract theory of union membership is further eroded, replaced by a "living" constitutional theory.
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tion, once he has exercised his rights to join or form the labor
organization. This rationale supports the exercise of internal
disciplinary actions against strikebreakers. It follows, however,
that since § 7 rights are ceded to individuals and not to unions,
this waiver should be narrowly construed and not extend
beyond the confines of the internal union organization. The
Supreme Court, however, has taken a broader view, holding that
a union's privilege to impose court-enforced fines, an external
penalty, against members who cross the picket line serves a
legitimate union interest in strike solidarity out-weighing the individual member's right to refrain from engaging in the strike."
Union members who cross picket lines established by a
union other than their own can be fined by their union as long as
the sympathy strike is not proscribed by the collective bargaining agreement.2 Sister unions may not impose fines, under the
ambit of the International Constitution, on another union local's
membership for refusing to respect the sister local's picket
lines." In this situation the General Counsel of the NLRB holds
the view that the fined union members did not voluntarily
subscribe to the rule, and, as such, the rule was invalid as to
them. " Fines imposed upon sympathy strikebreakers in the face
of a no strike clause have also been held illegal as violative of
public policy." However, if the no strike clause reserved the
right of the individual employee to respect the picket line, the
union may use this reservation to properly impose a disciplinary
fine against the strikebreakers under the Allis-Chalmers rationale."
In three other related contexts the Board has held that the
legitimate interests in strike solidarity are outweighed by the
" See notes 36-40 supra, and accompanying text. Note the lack of articulatable standards or criteria for the decision which allows this policy argument to be
used. See also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
" Davis-McKee, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1978); Local 843, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 232 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (1977).
Quarterly Report of the General Counsel (NLRB), 2d Quarter 1979. See
also Electrical Workers, Local 1260 (IBEW), 239 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (1978).
"Id.
" Mine Workers Local 12419 (UMWA), 176 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (1969).

"

Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Operating

Engineers, Local 18, 238 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1978). (No strike clause did not ex-

pressly preclude participation in sympathy actions; therefore, union fine legal.)
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public policy arguments of encouraging collective bargaining
and the peaceful resolution of labor disputes. First, unionimposed fines on strikebreaking members after an amnesty
agreement has been settled are illegal." Second, union-imposed
fines upon strikebreaking members in the face of a no strike
clause are also illegal." And, third, union-imposed fines of
strikebreaking members are illegal if the strike is in violation of
NLRA § 8(b)(4).'1
B. Other "Traitorous"Acts and Activities Not in the
Union's Interests
Union-imposed disciplinary fines must serve a legitimate interest and outweigh the incursion into the ambit of NLRA § 7
rights. Thus, the union's imposition of a fine on a member who
charges," or encourages another to charge,"1 a union with an unfair labor practice is illegal. Likewise, the union imposition of
fines against a member who files a lawsuit against the union is
illegal.2 Moreover, in these issues of access to Board and court
tribunals the union is deemed to have no legitimate interest and
no internal or external disciplinary action can be imposed."
A union is deemed to have a legitimate interest in a member
circulating, signing, or filing a decertification petition. Surprisingly, this interest is limited, however, only allowing exercises
of internal union disciplinary measures such as expulsion or
suspension." Similarly, a member soliciting authorization cards
in support of a rival union may be subject to internal disciplinHospital Workers Local 250 (SEIU), 248 N.L.R.B. No. 187 (1980).
' Glaiziers, Local 1162, 117 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (1969).
" NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 30, 549 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1977).
" NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
" Moving Picture Operators, Local 307, 159 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (1966), enforced, 382 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1967).
Operating Engineers, Local 3 v. Burroughs, 417 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1969).
" A union may not do indirectly what is prohibited directly. ITO Corporation of Rhode Island, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (1979) (refusal to hear grievance in
retaliation for filing an unfair labor practice charge held illegal); Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (1980) (union discipline as
a pretext for retaliation in filing unfair labor practice and engaging in rival union
activities held illegal).
U Molders Local 125 (Blackhawk Tanning), 178 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (1969), enforced, 442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971).
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ary actions but not external fines. 5 These exceptions to the
"means of external rule enforcement" established in AllisChalmers appear without a consistent basis. Rather, it turns on
practical considerations of allowing a union to purge "traitors"
and yet protect individual NLRA § 7 rights from external fines.
These exceptions cannot be reconciled with the courts' view of
the statutory duality concept as it relates to the means of rule
enforcement exception in Allis-Chalmers or to the arguments on
the reasonableness of fines in Boeing."
A union is not deemed to have a legitimate interest in silencing the testimony of employee-members, and, therefore, disciplinary actions imposed have been held unlawful. This view utilizes the public policy argument and has been applied to testimony before administrative hearings" and arbitration hearings"
and includes filing a written statement with such tribunals.9
Thus, an employee-member cannot be disciplined for exercising
access to outside agencies or tribunals. However, when the testimony is in the form of an initial unsolicited report to an employer regarding a fellow employee's violation of employer-created
work rules, a union disciplinary fine is legal since the activity is
neither protected by NLRA § 7 rights nor by public policy.'
Additionally, a union does not have a legitimate interest allowing disciplinary actions regarding a member's political activities
even though they oppose union policies, platforms, or candidates.10 '
11Tri-Rivers Marine Engineers Union (U.S. Steel Corp.), 189 N.L.R.B. No.
108 (1971); Textile Workers, Local 953, 189 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (1971).
" See notes 47-60 supra, and accompanying text.
17Automotive Salesmen's Ass'n (Spitler-Demmer, Inc.), 184 N.L.R.B. No. 64

(1970).
" Local 788, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 190 N.L.R.B. No. 5
(1971); Automobile Workers Local 1989, UAW, 249 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (1980).
Amalgamated Transit Union, No. 825, 240 N.L.R.B. No. 166 (1979).
10 Local 5795, Communications Wkrs. of Amer., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (1971).
101 Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972) (opposition to union policies);
Retail Clerks, Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'nat'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C.
1969) (opposition to union endorsed candidate); Mitchell v. IAM, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813
(1961) (member disciplined for support of right to work law held improper); Local
282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (1980) (retalia-

tion for dissident activities held improper); see also LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.

§ 411(a)(2) (1970):
(2) Freedom of Speech and Assembly.-Every member of any labor
organization shall have the right to meet and assemble free with other
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A union is deemed to have a legitimate interest in the enforcement of union-created work rules outweighing the union
member's NLRA § 7 right to refuse to participate in concerted
0 2 held valid disciplinary actions
activities. The Scofield decision"
against members who exceeded a union rule governing production quotas as the rule "left the collective bargaining process
unimpaired, breached no collective contract, required no pay for
unperformed services, induced no discrimination by an employer
against any class of employees, and represented no dereliction
by the union of its duty of fair representation."'0 3 To the extent
the work rule serves a legitimate union interest it is held a valid
subject for union disciplinary action.' For example, fining members for operating more machines than required by an employer
has been upheld' as have actions against non-supervisory members working with non-members.'
Disciplinary actions against supervisor-members have presented special problems in resolving the balance. Section
8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA protects employers "in the selection of representatives for purposes of collective bargaining or the processing of grievances.""' This section of the NLRA adds weight
to a finding of an illegal union disciplinary action. In American
BroadcastingCompanies v. Writers Guild"' the Court struck the
balance against the union, holding disciplinary actions against
supervisor-members who perform collective bargaining or grievance handling duties unlawful. 9 The Board has interpreted §

-

members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and
reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided,That
nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of
every member toward the organization as an institution and to his

refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its
legal or contractual obligations.
10 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
10 Id. at 436.
104

Note that these "standards" do not articulate NLRA § 7 rights.

Id.

International Ass'n of Machinist & Aerospace Wkrs. Lodge 284 (Caterpillar Tractor Co.), Adv. Mem. No. 32-CG-265 (1978).
'" Sheetmetal Wkrs. Int'nat'l Ass'n Local 36, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (1979).
0 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
"1 437 U.S. 411 (1978), compare Florida Power & Light v. Electrical
Workers, 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
0I

109Id.
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8(b)(1)(B) very broadly, holding that any action which
"reasonably tends to interfere" with an employer's ability to obtain supervisors from among the union membership who were
willing to serve is illegal.110 This view effectively insulates
supervisor-members from union disciplinary actions except
where a union rule is exclusively internal, i.e., fines for failure to
attend a union meeting, or where the union imposing the disciplinary action is not the representing union in the employer's
collective bargaining negotiations."' Thus, the legitimate interest of the union in cases involving supervisor-members is strictly construed, more often in favor of the supervisor-member
under the furthering of public labor policy argument, rather
than a strict reading of the statutory language. "
IV.

SORTING THROUGH THE MIRE:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Analyzing the union disciplinary cases decided thus far
under § 8(b)(1)(A), several interesting observations arise. If the
disciplinary action is imposed upon a non-member employee it is
by definition coercion of NLRA § 7 rights and, therefore, illegal.
Applying the balancing approach, the union's action is not protected under NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso, and, therefore, the
employee's right to refuse to engage in concerted activity is protected. This principle is applicable to employee-members who
resign prior to violating the union rule.
In evaluating disciplinary actions against full members involving the infringement of NLRA § 7 rights, the cases decided
thus far present a not so subtle shift in analysis. In these cases
the NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) proviso is given full effect but the reliance
upon the infringement of NLRA § 7 rights is given timid application. The courts and the Board rely upon the public labor policy
arguments to justify their decisions or upon the NLRA § 8(b)(2)
restriction to strike down the union disciplinary action. In fact,
the cases which hold union disciplinary actions illegal could have
been decided without any reference to NLRA § 7 rights, relying
instead almost exclusively upon NLRA § 8(b)(2) or the public
u Printing Pressman's Local 2, 249 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (1980).
NLRB v. Electrical Wkrs., Local 73, 621 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1980).
I This is a catch-all argument with no established parameters and is used to
simply justify, or downplay, the conclusion derived. See notes 36-41 supra and ac-

companying text.
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policy of other provisions in the NLRA."' This leads to several
operational conclusions.
First, it appears that the reliance upon the public policy
arguments, having no articulated standards, allows the tribunals
to simply render decisions to complex issues in generalities and
to bypass, when desired, the confines of the statutory duality
concept.1 1 4 Second, the language of NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) concerning
restraint and coercion is not given substantial effect, leading
one to conclude that there exists an implied waiver of NLRA § 7
rights with respect to union membership. This implied waiver of
NLRA § 7 rights would be of less consequence if the AllisChalmers and Boeing Courts had not allowed the effects of this
implied waiver to follow a disciplined member beyond the union
organizational structure. As such, the Court has implied two
waivers of NLRA § 7 rights. One waives NLRA § 7 rights in
avoiding internal union disciplinary actions, while the other
waives NLRA § 7 rights to avoid external discipline. This second waiver has no justification." 5 Arguably, if resignation from
union membership constitutes a redemption of NLRA § 7 rights,
external disciplinary actions should face the full redemption of a
member's NLRA § 7 rights. And, third, in regard to supervisors,
the language of NLRA § 8(b)(1)(B) is given over-broad effect.
This schizophrenic application of statutory language leads to
questionable predictability in the analysis.
In practical terms, the only defense an individual employeemember has against union disciplinary actions constraining
NLRA § 7 rights is refusal to become a full member or resignation prior to the rule infringement. This implies knowledge on
the part of the employee of the membership options, the full
range of union disciplinary rules, and the provisions of the labor
laws. Further, unions are not required to inform their members
of their membership options in regard to union rules, union
",

This is not to imply that the cases were decided wrongly, only that the deci-

sion process was, at best, sloppy. Moreover, this can be viewed as the Board's
procedure to circumvent the restrictions of the statutory duality concept. Section
8(b)(1){A) protects employees against restraint or coercion of NLRA § 7 rights. In

my view, it was not meant as a catch-all vehicle, as not all violations of labor law
necessarily involve NLRA § 7 rights.
"I By using generalized policy arguments, the tribunals can, just as easily,
refuse to render a decision or, given the fact sensitivity of a particular situation,
virtually fashion any particular remedy they desire.
"' See notes 36-60 supra and accompanying text.
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security clauses, and unfair labor practices. Thus, employeemembers are at a disadvantage in circumventing union disciplinary actions. This situation is a product of the lack of effect
given to NLRA § 7 rights in the balance with the NLRA §
8(b)(1)(A) proviso and the handicaps placed upon the Board in
regard to external penalties.
Thus, the balance is generally skewed in favor of the NLRA
§ 8(b)(1)(A) proviso. Moreover, by not articulating standards or
providing a substantive analytical paradigm the tribunals have
created a situation where only grossly outrageous union behavior is enjoined under violations of NLRA § 8(b)(2) or under the
public policy exception. This virtually allows the infringement of
the NLRA § 7 rights of members which does not fall at the extreme.
This mire of problems can be traced back to one focal
point-NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers. By sanctioning external fine enforcement and denying Board scrutiny over the means of external rule enforcement, the Court made a poor policy decision
which it further compounded in Boeing."6 From this poor policy
decision emanated the emasculation of a union member's NLRA
§ 7 rights and a shift to reliance on generalized policy arguments. The cumulative effect of this policy decision is a power
grant to the unions at the expense of members' NLRA § 7 rights
and the creation of an area of potential abuse. The LMRDA provisions are inadequate to protect the individual members'
rights, and the state courts lack the necessary expertise in
labor-management and member-union problems. The only viable
alternative is a check provided by the Board, but not through
reliance upon unarticulated policy arguments. A better ap," Justice Brennan's decision in Allis-Chalmers was based on a weak public
policy argument. (See notes 36-45 supra and accompanying text.) This decision
straitjacketed the Court into a line of decisions that, although arguably consistent, are unworkable. To further compound matters, the Board has seen fit to
sidestep the rationale in Allis-Chalmers at times. (See notes 94-96 supra and
accompanying text). This leads one to a conclusion that instead of clarifying
NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A) the courts and the NLRB have done the contrary and seem to
be unwilling to articulate operational guidelines and standards.
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proach is through realigning the balancing test and giving
operational effect to members' NLRA § 7 rights.11
James B. Zimarowski
"T This advocates overruling Allis-Chalmers and removing the external
remedy from a union's disciplinary arsenal. To undo the line of cases, however,
would require extensive rulemaking by the NLRB or legislative intervention. The
other alternative is through the case by case articulations of standards by the
Board. This approach, however, requires the NLRB to refrain from the generalized public policy argument crutch.
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